Abstract -De-Identification is a process which can be used to ensure privacy by concealing the identity of individuals captured by video surveillance systems. One important challenge is to make the obfuscation process reversible so that the original image/video can be recovered by persons in possession of the right security credentials. This work presents a novel Reversible De-Identification method that can be used in conjunction with any obfuscation process. The residual information needed to reverse the obfuscation process is compressed, authenticated, encrypted and embedded within the obfuscated image using a two-level Reversible Watermarking scheme. The proposed method ensures an overall single-pass embedding capacity of 1.25 bpp, where 99.8% of the images considered required less than 0.8 bpp while none of them required more than 1.1 bpp. Experimental results further demonstrate that the proposed method managed to recover and authenticate all images considered.
INTRODUCTION
Video surveillance cameras are becoming ubiquitous in many developed countries. This has raised several privacy concerns which have pushed policy makers to regulate their use. One approach to provide privacy is to obfuscate sensitive regions within an image/video which prevents the identification of the persons being captured. The authors in [1, 2] have proposed an irreversible obfuscation method which however, prevents the use of the captured videos from aiding criminal investigation or to be used as evidence in court [3] .
Reversible De-Identification is a process which, while still concealing the identity of individuals, enables persons in possession of high security credentials to recover the original multimedia content containing private information. The authors in [4] encode the region of interest (ROI) and background in separate data layers using JPEG2000. On the other hand, the authors in [5, 6] employ encryption strategies directly on the pixel intensities of the ROI. However, these methods completely destroy the naturalness of the captured video.
A ROI transform-domain scrambling technique was presented in [7, 8, 9] for different image/video compression standards. The scrambling process better maintains the naturalness of the video. However this method is less secure since it reveals the intensity levels of the original content. Moreover, the obfuscation and reversibility processes are dependent on each other, and thus cannot be used in conjunction with other obfuscation methods. Nonreversible watermarking was adopted in [3, 10] to solve the latter issue and embed the information needed to recover the De-Identified region within the video itself. However, both these schemes are irreversible since the noise introduced by the watermark embedding process is permanent. Moreover, these schemes have registered a substantial reduction in compression efficiency. The authors in [11] employ reversible watermarking to solve the former issue. However, this method induces significant distortions within the obfuscated image themselves.
This work presents a Reversible De-Identification method for lossless images. This approach adopts Reversible Watermarking to make the system reversible. The proposed solution is completely independent from the obfuscation process, and is thus generic. Nonetheless, this work employs the k-Same obfuscation process, which ensures k-anonymity, to obfuscate the face of frontal images. The difference between the original and obfuscated image is compressed, authenticated, encrypted and embedded within the obfuscated image itself. This method keeps the naturalness of the obfuscated images while the original image can only be recovered by individuals having the proper encryption key. The Reversible Watermarking schemes adopted in this work were found to outperform existing state-of-the-art schemes. Furthermore, experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can recover and authenticate all obfuscated images considered. This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a high-level description of the proposed system and introduces the notation used in the latter sections. The Forward and Inverse Reversible De-Identification processes are explained in more detail in sections III and IV with the experimental results delivered in section V. The final comments and concluding remarks are drawn in section VI. Fig. 1 illustrates the schematic diagram of the Forward Reversible De-Identification process which receives the original image I and conceals the face of the person using the Face Obfuscation process to generate an obfuscated image I ϴ . This work considers color images using the YC b C r color space. The coordinates of the top left corner and bottom right corner of the De-identified region is enclosed within the bounding box β, which is passed to both ROI Extraction processes to extract the face image F and the obfuscated face image F ϴ . The face images are then subtracted to derive the difference face image D.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The Payload Generator process is then used to convert the difference face image D and bounding box β into a packet p e a which is authenticated and encrypted. The packet p e a is then embedded within the obfuscated image I ϴ using the Integer Wavelet Transform (IWT) Reversible Watermark Embedding process (1st level) which generates the embedded image I θ W , the auxiliary information A and the residual bitstream e. This method provides a good compromise between capacity and distortion. However, additional information might be needed at the receiver to resolve overflow and underflow issues. The Reversible Contrast Mapping Embedding process (2nd level) is therefore used to embed this information (A and e) within the embedded image I θ W , which usually corresponds to few bits, and generates the second level embedded obfuscated image Î θ W . This method is ideal since it does not need additional information to resolve overflow/underflow issues. Moreover, the distortions introduced at low bitrates is generally negligible. However, its performance significantly degrades at higher bitrates and is therefore not suitable to embed large payloads. It is important to notice at this stage that the packet p e a is authenticated and encrypted, and therefore the difference image D and bounding box β can only be recovered correctly by persons in possession of the correct security key. The embedding processes are chosen in order to provide minimal distortion so that it maintains the naturalness of the obfuscated image. Moreover, the authentication process ensures that the original image is recovered and ensures that the image is not modified.
III. FORWARD REVERSIBLE DE-IDENTIFICATION

A. Face Obfuscation
The Face Obfuscation process receives the original image I and detects the face region and eye locations using the ground truth information available in the color FERET dataset. This can be automated using the face detector in [12] and the eye detector in [13] which ensure high accuracies. However, the main contribution of this work is to present a Reversible De-Identification method which is independent from the obfuscation process. Thus, the automation of the face and eye detectors is not in the scope of this work.
The upper left and bottom right coordinates of the face region are included in the bounding box β and used to extract the face F which is aligned using affine transformations [14] . The aligned face image F is then concealed using the k-same algorithm, which computes the average face derived over the k closest aligned faces in Eigen-space, to generate the obfuscated aligned face image F ϴ . More information on the k-same algorithm can be found in [2] . The obfuscated face image F ϴ is then realigned to match the orientation of the original face image F using affine transformations and then overwrites the face region in the original image I to derive the obfuscated image I ϴ .
B. ROI Extraction
The ROI Extraction process is a simple algorithm which employs the bounding box coordinates β to identify the region to be cropped from the input image I (or I ϴ ). The cropped sub-image is then stored in the face image F (or obfuscated face image F ϴ ).
C. Payload Generator
The Payload Generator Process receives the difference image D which is compressed using the predictive coding method presented in [15] followed by the Deflate algorithm [16] . The original image I is authenticated using SHA-1 which generates a 20-Byte Hash. The Hash will be used by the Inverse Reversible De-Identification process to ensure that it recovers the original image I, and is thus appended to the Payload. The bounding box coordinates β are also required at the receiver to identify the face region and are therefore included as information within the header. The resulting packet p a , illustrated in Fig. 3 , was then encrypted using AES-128 to generate the encrypted packet p e a .
D. IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding
The IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding process first derives the number of decompositions N dec needed to embed the packet p e a within I ϴ using
where M indicates the maximum number of decomposition allowed and C represents the capacity needed to embed p e a bits and is computed using
where represents the cardinality of the set, W and H represent the number of columns and rows in the image and Ch represents the number of color channels (in our case 3). This process then adopts the CDF(2,2) integer wavelet transform specified in [17] to decompose the image. This method employs Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion to embed the actual information while a novel Threshold Selection strategy is used to identify the set of thresholds which provide enough capacity while minimize the overall distortions. More information is provided in the following subsections.
1) Threshold Selection
The proposed Threshold Selection method is based on the observation that different sub-bands provide different levels of distortions [18] . However, in order to reduce the complexity of the optimization function, the following assumptions were made x
The chrominance sub-bands have similar properties and thus share the same threshold.
x
The HL and LH sub-bands within the same color channel (luminance or chrominance) are assumed to have similar characteristics and therefore have the same threshold.
The number of thresholds to be considered by the Threshold Selection process is given by
In order to clarify this, consider a single level of decomposition. In this case N T = 4 where T 1 is the threshold for coefficients in sub-band HH 1 of the luminance component, T 2 is the threshold for coefficients in sub-band HL 1 and LH 1 of the luminance component, T 3 is the threshold for coefficients in sub-band HH 1 in the chrominance components (C b and C r ) and T 4 is the threshold for coefficients in sub-bands HL 1 and LH 1 in the chrominance components. Note that the subscript for the sub-bands represents the level of decomposition. The thresholds corresponding to sub-bands at higher level of decomposition are considered to be the same for the same color component. Therefore, if we consider a second level of decomposition (N T = 6), the additional threshold T 5 controls the coefficients in sub-bands HH 2 , HL 2 and LH 2 for the luminance component while threshold T 6 is responsible for the coefficients in sub-bands HH 2 , HL 2 and LH 2 for the chrominance components. The same happens for higher levels of decompositions.
One naive approach is to use exhaustive search to find the optimal set of thresholds. However, this has a time complexity of the order of O(n N T ) where n represents the search range. An alternative approach is to use a metaheuristic approach to solve this optimization problem. This work employs Differential Evolution (DE) [19] , which is a population based optimization algorithm, to derive the set of threshold which minimize a distortion criterion while ensuring that the capacity of the proposed system is sufficient to embed the message s. The time complexity provided by this scheme is of the order of O(G×NP×N T ), where NP is the population size and G corresponds to the number of generations.
Differential Evolution starts with a random set of possible solutions and tries to find better solutions through mutation and cross-over. The set of potential thresholds Δ is a list of threshold NP vectors which are initialized using a uniformly distributed random number generator. The threshold vectors i Δ T which do not provide enough capacity are pruned and replaced by another random vector which satisfies it. The population of thresholds evolves over a number of generations using mutation and cross-over. The mutation process generates a mutant vector for every threshold vector contained within the population of NP vectors using Ratio (wPSNR) and is used to represent the fitness of the threshold T [20] . The NP threshold vectors which have the largest fitness values from the two sets are then grouped to replace the initial set Δ . The iterative process is terminated when either the maximum number of generations G max is reached or else when the difference between the largest and smallest wPSNR within the list of thresholds Δ is smaller than some constant Φ.
2) Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion
The Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion process receives the set of thresholds T which are derived by the Threshold Selection process and encapsulates the packet p e a shown in Fig. 3 to generate the packet s to be embedded (Fig. 4) . The field N dec is a ª º M 2 log bit field which specifies the number of decompositions used by the embedding process, T is a variable length field which specifies the threshold adopted (8-bit per threshold) and L is a 10-bit field which specifies the cardinality of p e a in bytes. This information is inserted as header information since the decoder needs it to reverse the process.
The packet s is inserted within the high frequency sub-bands of the integer wavelet coefficients. During the embedding process, a wavelet coefficient w µ,j in sub-band µ is selected at random following a random permutation generated using the encryption key. A wavelet coefficient w µ,j is considered for embedding if its magnitude is smaller than the threshold responsible of sub-band µ. A bit b is embedded using
The other wavelet coefficients are not considered for embedding. However, in order to prevent ambiguities at the receiver, they are expanded using where T µ is the threshold responsible for sub-band µ.This process is terminated once all the bits in s are embedded. In the rare event where this process fails to embed all bits, these bits are stored in a bit-sequence e. The expanded obfuscated image I θ W is then obtained using the inverse integer wavelet transform. The coordinates of pixels which encounter underflow/overflow issues and their corresponding values are included within the list of auxiliary information A.
E. Reversible Contrast Mapping
The only problem with the proposed Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion process is that sometimes A and e are not empty. This work adopts the syntax shown in Fig. 5 to represent this information r to be embedded. The Flag is a 2-bit field which indicates whether A and e are empty or not. In case that one of them (or both) are not empty, the number of bits needed to embed the information in A (or e) is signaled in N A (or N e ) . The fields N A and N e are encoded using 8-bits each while the size of A and e are variable length.
This work adopts the Reversible Contrast Mapping (RCM) [21] to embed the packet r within the watermarked obfuscated image I θ W . The main advantage of using RCM is that it embeds all information within the image without any ambiguities and provides an additional capacity of 0.5 bpp. However, the main limitation of the RCM is its limited capacity and that the distortion can become significant when embedding large payloads. However, the packet size r is expected to be very low (generally 2-bits).
The forward RCM transforms two neighboring pixel pairs (x, y) into (x', y') using
To prevent overflow and underflow, the transform is restricted to a sub-domain defined by the pixels which satisfy the conditions
The RCM scheme replaces the least significant bits (LSBs) of the transformed pairs (x', y'). The LSB of x' is used to indicate whether information is embedded within y' or not. A value of '1' indicates that information is embedded while a value of '0' can indicate two things. It can be that both pixel pair values (x, y) were odd or else that the pair are ambiguous and cannot be used for embedding. In the former case, the information bit is still embedded within the LSB of y'. On the other hand, the latter case cannot be used to embed information and thus the LSB of y' is not changed, while the true value of the LSB of x is inserted within the bit-sequence being embedded. More information about the RCM scheme can be found in [21] .
IV. INVERSE REVERSIBLE DE-IDENTIFICATION
A. Reversible Contrast Mapping Extraction
The Reversible Contrast Mapping Extraction process receives the image Î θ W and recovers I θ W and r. The information bit can be extracted from the LSB of y' when the LSB of x' is '1'. However, in the event when the LSB of x' is '0', both LSBs of x' and y' are forced to be odd and condition (9) is checked. If the condition is satisfied it then represents an odd pixel pair while if it does not it indicates that y = y' and the original LSB value of x is extracted from the bitstream. More information about this is available in [21] . The auxiliary information A and residual bitstream e are then extracted from the packet r. The original pixel values are recovered using 
B. IWT Reversible Watermarking Extraction
The IWT Reversible Watermarking Extraction reverses the IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding process and extracts the payload information p e a and the original obfuscated image I ϴ . It must be noted here that initially, the decoder has no knowledge about the number of decompositions employed N dec and the threshold values T. The decoder thus assumes that a single decomposition is employed and that the threshold values are set to zero. These values are then updated once they are extracted from the header information of s. It is important that the encoder does the same thing during embedding in order to ensure synchronization between the encoder and decoder.
The watermarked obfuscated image I θ W is then decomposed into N dec levels using the CDF(2,2) integer wavelet transform and the wavelet coefficients of the high frequency sub-bands are scanned using the random permutation index generated using the encryption key. The bits of the packet are extracted from coefficients which satisfy the condition 
C. ROI Replacement
The ROI Replacement process replaces the region marked by the bounding box β with the recovered face image F. The image I rec can be authenticated by comparing the hash derived by computing the SHA-1 on I rec to the Hash value present in the tail of the packet p a .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The results presented in this section consider two different sets of images. The first set was composed of the standard test images Lena, Barbara, Aircraft and Mandrill while the second set consisted of 2000 frontal images from the color FERET dataset. All images considered in this work were converted in the YC b C r color space using 4:4:4 sampling. The standard test images were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed Threshold Selection process while the frontal images were used to evaluate the whole system.
The proposed algorithm has set the maximum number of decompositions M to 3 which ensures a single pass embedding capacity offered by the first level of watermarking of 0.9844 bpp. The Difference Expansion method was configured using values suggested in [19] and thus adopted α = 0.5, NP = 100 and Γ = 0.3. This paper does not claim that this corresponds to an optimal configuration, but claims that it provides performance superior to state of the art IWT threshold selection schemes such as [17] (see Fig. 6 ). These results clearly demonstrate that the proposed scheme manages to provide better quality of the stego image I θ W at different capacities. Simulation results further demonstrate that the proposed scheme needs on average 20 generations to converge. This correspond to 2000 invocations of the fitness function which is significantly less than the 255 N T invocations needed by exhaustive search. Fig. 7 demonstrates the cumulative density function (CDF) of the capacity needed to embed packet s within the obfuscated image using the set of 2000 frontal images from the color FERET dataset. It can be seen that a capacity smaller than 0.8 bpp is needed 99.8% of the time while they never require more than 1.1 bpp. It must be mentioned that the proposed scheme has a single-pass embedding capacity close to 1.25 bpp and is thus able to embed the information necessary to recover all images considered in this test. It is important to mention here that frontal images represent a very difficult scenario for our system since the area covered by the ROI is large in relation to the background. Lower capacities are expected when considering common surveillance scenarios. Simulation results further demonstrate that the residual bitstream e was empty for 99.8% of the time and the Auxiliary information A was empty for 99.85% of the time. This result confirms that most of the time the RCM reversible watermarking scheme embeds just 2-bits within the obfuscated image. Moreover, the additional capacity needed in these circumstances was at most 0.015bpp, which is very small and provides negligible distortions.
The images in Fig. 8 demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method in relation to other state of the art methods. It can be seen that the encryption [5] and scrambling [8] processes provide images which are not natural. Moreover, it can be seen that the reversible deidentification process presented in this work, which embeds the information using reversible watermarking, manages to keep the image natural. It is important to notice that the person de-identified using k-same is not recognizable from his facial features since eyes, nose and mouth features are modified and that the distortion introduced by the watermark is almost negligible. This work can be extended to other soft biometrics, such as hear. The system was also tested using erroneous encryption keys at the receiver. In all tests conducted the receiver failed to recover the original image when the wrong encryption key is used.
VI. CONLUSION
This work presents a novel Reversible DeIdentification method for lossless compressed images. The proposed scheme is generic and can be employed with other obfuscation strategies other than k-Same. A twolevel Reversible-Watermarking scheme was adopted which uses Differential Evolution to find the optimal set of thresholds and provides a single-pass embedding capacity close to 1.25 bpp. Simulation results have shown that this method is able to recover the original image if the correct encryption key is employed. It further shows that 0.8 bpp were sufficient to cater for 99.8% of the frontal images considered and none of the image needed more than 1.1 bpp. Future work will focus on the extension of this algorithm for lossy image and video compression standards. 
